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Casenotes and Comments 
 
VARSITY BLUES: STUDENT ATHLETE UNIONIZATION IS THE 
WRONG WAY FORWARD TO REFORM COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS 
MICHAEL P. CIANFICHI* 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and Ameri-
can collegiate athletics model are under intense scrutiny, both in the court 
of law and public opinion.  While the end goals to reform the lackluster ed-
ucation standards and to cease the exploitation of student athletes are neces-
sary and legitimate, the same cannot be said of the means by which some 
groups and commentators seek to do so.  For example, the recent decision 
by a Regional Director (“RD”) of the National Labor Relations Board (“the 
Board”) in the Northwestern University1 (“NWU”) case finding scholarship 
football student athletes to be “employees” within the meaning of Section 
2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) violates established 
precedent and inappropriately thrusts labor union norms into the realm of 
higher education.2  Board precedent and statutory interpretation of the Act 
demonstrate that student athletes on scholarship at a university are not—and 
were never intended to be—employees of their university within the mean-
ing of the Act.3  On review, the Board should therefore reverse the RD’s 
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Varsity Blues is a reference to the 2011 song by the artist known as Wale, in which he, as a 
former student athlete, describes the problems he sees in the collegiate athletic model.  WALE, 
VARSITY BLUES (The Board Administration 2011).  
 1. Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), Case 13-RC-121359, at *2 
(N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 [here-
inafter NWU]. 
 2.  See infra Part II.A.2.  One of thirty-two different regional directors first hears a petition-
er’s case before it is appealed to the five-member Board panel. 
 3.  See infra Part II.A.  Note that the members of the Board are not Article III judges and are 
thus not bound to the doctrine of stare decisis in the same way that Article III judges are.  Inter-
state Tel. Co-op., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 518 N.W.2d 749, 752 (S.D. 1994) (citing Motor 
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decision or, in the alternative, vacate the RD’s decision and decline jurisdic-
tion. 
By involving itself in this issue, the Board risks creating severe unin-
tended consequences4  and further complicating the matter due to its limited 
jurisdiction.5  Instead, this Comment recommends the NCAA should drive 
efforts to remedy the exploitative collegiate athletics model and focus on 
what is best for the student athlete in the long term—obtaining an education 
and degree.6  The NCAA, more than the Board or a state legislature, is best 
positioned to enact equitable, uniform, and effective reforms.  These re-
forms should include allowing student athletes to profit from the use of 
their image and likeness,7 and reemphasizing the “student” in student ath-
lete by ensuring that student athletes have the opportunity to succeed in the 
classroom.8 
The NWU case places the fate of student athletes across the country at 
a crossroads: the cold economics of an employment relationship in one di-
rection and a warm and strong educational environment in the other.  This 
Comment strongly supports the latter, recognizing that universities are a 
place where all those pursuing degrees are primarily students and must be 
treated as such, with the goal of providing the knowledge and skills neces-
sary for a successful career—not temporary employment.  Although univer-
sities provide student athletes with full-ride scholarships, one must ask 
whether these “free educations” are also free of educational value.  Instead 
of shortsightedly changing collegiate athletics to make student athletes ath-
letic employees of their university, a renewed emphasis on education would 
be the wiser reform, fulfilling the university mission of preparing its stu-
dents for a long and prosperous career. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Since Congress passed the Act in 1935 as a remedy to industrial work-
place tensions and inequalities, the Board has applied it to universities in 
conflicting ways.  Initially loath to find the Act applicable to an academic 
setting, the Board later interpreted the definition of “employee” under Sec-
tion 2(3) to preclude graduate assistants (“GAs”) and similar students who 
received financial aid in return for duties from statutory coverage.9  The 
                                                          
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)) (“Both fed-
eral and state courts have repeatedly noted, however, that administrative agencies are not bound 
by stare decisis as it applies to previous agency decisions.”). 
 4.  See infra Part II.B. 
 5.  See infra Part II.C. 
 6.  See infra Part II.D. 
 7.  See infra Part II.D.1. 
 8.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
 9.  E.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972) (finding graduate assistants were not uni-
versity employees under the Act). 
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Board departed from that precedent in New York University,10 where it used 
the common law employee test to find that the Act did cover such stu-
dents.11  Shortly after, however, the Board overturned that decision in 
Brown University12 and returned to precedent finding that GAs were not 
university employees under the Act.13  Recently, scholarship football play-
ers at NWU awakened the debate over the employment status of students 
receiving financial aid after a RD granted their petition to be labeled em-
ployees under the Act.14 
A.  Congress Enacted the National Labor Relations Act to Cure 
Industrial Workplace Strife 
In 1935, Congress enacted the Act to encourage collective bargaining 
as a means of addressing industrial strife and inequality in bargaining power 
between private sector employees and employers, with the end goal of im-
proving wages and working conditions.15  Congress declared that the denial 
of basic rights to organize, to collectively bargain, and to work under safe 
conditions not only harmed the general welfare of employees but also of the 
national economy as a whole.16  The Act established the right for workers to 
self-organize and choose their own representative to negotiate their em-
ployment terms and conditions.17  To further this objective, the Act created 
the Board as the enforcing agency.18 
If workers wish to organize as a union with collective bargaining 
rights, they must petition the Board to grant them those rights.  As a prereq-
uisite, the employer must be an “employer” as defined by the Act, and, as 
follows, the employees must meet the Act’s definition of “employee.”19  
Section 2(3) of the Act reads “The term ‘employee’ shall include any em-
ployee . . . .”20 and then lists employees exempted from statutory cover-
age.21  With little guidance from the ambiguous statute as to what groups 
                                                          
 10.  N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000). 
 11.  Id. at 1205. 
 12.  Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). 
 13.  Id. at 483. 
 14.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *13 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.  
 15.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. § 153. 
 19.  Id. § 152(2)–(3).  For the full statutory definition of § 152(3) (on employees) see infra 
note 21. 
 20.  Id. § 152(3). 
 21.  Id. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include any individual employed as an 
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any indi-
vidual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent 
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employ-
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constitute statutory employees, the Board, as the delegated expert agency, 
has been instrumental in forming the governing law.22 
B.  The Majority of Board Precedent Determined That Students 
Working Part-Time for Their University Are Primarily Students, 
Not Employees 
This Section traces the Board’s involvement in decisions regarding 
whether students providing part-time services to their university while also 
receiving financial aid are employees under the Act.  As the student-athlete-
employee issue in NWU is one of first impression, analogous cases involve 
GAs or medical interns.23  GAs, along with their related peers, like scholar-
ship student athletes, are enrolled as degree-seeking students at a university 
and are expected to partake in certain activities in order to receive their fi-
nancial aid.24  Therefore, an understanding of the treatment of GAs with re-
spect to Section 2(3) of the Act provides important context for the student 
athlete issue. 
The majority of the Board’s cases on GA petitions exclude students 
from statutory coverage on the basis that being “primarily a student” pre-
cluded them from being an “employee” under the Act.25  The Board often 
justifies these decisions by stating collective bargaining rights would in-
fringe upon traditional academic freedoms and that students, as degree-
seeking individuals, are at their respective university in an educational and 
not an economic or employment relationship.26 
1.  1970–1999: The First Phase of Board Cases Denied Student-
Petitions for Employee Status 
It was not until 1970 that the Board first recognized private nonprofit 
universities as employers under the Act, giving it the prerequisite jurisdic-
                                                          
er subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is 
not an employer as herein defined.”).  
 22.  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (“[T]he task of defining the term 
‘employee’ is one that ‘has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to adminis-
ter the Act.’” (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944))).  
 23.  Graduate Assistants, when used in this article, includes research assistants, teaching as-
sistants, and fellows.  For a full explanation of medical interns, see infra note 35. 
 24.  Compare Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (noting that to maintain their fi-
nancial aid, the GAs must: (1) be enrolled as degree-seeking students, (2) maintain a full-time stu-
dent credit load, and (3) spend a mandatory amount of time in their duties), with NWU, Case 13-
RC-121359, at *9 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-
RC-121359 (imposing the same three requirements on the student athletes). 
 25.  E.g., Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004) (finding GAs are primar-
ily students, not employees). 
 26.  Id. at 490 (citing St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003 (1977)) 
(“[T]he Board concluded that collective bargaining would unduly infringe upon traditional aca-
demic freedoms.”). 
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tion to rule on whether students were employees of their university.27  
Shortly after, the Board denied petitions from GAs at Adelphi University28 
and at Stanford University29 by determining that the petitioners were pri-
marily students and thus not employees under the Act.30  The Board in both 
cases reasoned that the GAs were only at the university performing their 
duties because of their enrollment in pursuing a degree.31  The fact that the 
GAs performed services (grading, teaching, or research) in order to receive 
their financial aid packages did not make them employees under the Act.32  
To the contrary, in Stanford, the Board stressed the fact that the GAs re-
ceived the same amount of financial aid regardless of their tasks, hours 
worked, or work quality as supporting the conclusion that the purpose of 
their duties was to further academic growth and was not employee-based.33  
The Board distinguished the Stanford GAs from the employee-designated 
research associates, since the latter had already received their degree, were 
no longer enrolled as students, and could be fired.34 
Shortly after Stanford, the Board denied employee designation peti-
tions from medical interns and residents in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center35 
and St. Clare’s Hospital36 on the basis that they were each primarily stu-
dents and not employees under the Act.37  The Board in Cedars-Sinai used 
the justification from Stanford in reasoning that the fact that the financial 
aid the petitioners received was not dependent on the nature, the quality, or 
the amount of time spent on their work showed that no employment rela-
                                                          
 27.  Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1970).  The emphasis on private universities is 
because the Act excludes federal or state institutions (e.g., public universities) from coverage.  29 
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term “employer” . . . shall not include the United States . . . or any 
State of political subdivision thereof . . . .”).  Collective bargaining rights for public state employ-
ees are governed by their respective state’s labor laws.  MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CENTER 
FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN THE STATES 3 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/state-
public-cb-2014-03.pdf. 
 28.  Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 639. 
 29.  The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).   
 30.  Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 640; Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 623. 
 31.  Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 640. 
 32.  Id.; Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622. 
 33.  Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 621–22. 
 34.  Id. at 623.  In contrast, Stanford could not fire the GAs since they were students seeking a 
degree; therefore even if they failed to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner, the only re-
percussion would be a non-passing grade.  Id.  
 35.  Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).  The term “intern” is specific to its 
medical context: “An intern is a medical school graduate serving his first period of graduate medi-
cal training in a hospital.  Most states, including California, require an internship of 1 year to qual-
ify for the examination to practice medicine.  A resident is a physician who has completed an in-
ternship and serves a period of more advanced training, lasting from 1 to 5 years, in a specialty.”  
Id. at 251. 
 36.  St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977). 
 37.  Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 251; St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003. 
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tionship existed.38  Although the petitioning students in Cedars-Sinai spent 
more time on direct patient care duties than in a traditional classroom set-
ting, the Board noted that these duties were required aspects of the student-
training program, making them a necessary component of their education.39  
The petitioning students therefore were at Cedars-Sinai as part of an educa-
tional—not employment—relationship.40 
In St. Clare’s, the Board explained why a student-employment rela-
tionship would be inappropriate for an educational setting.  The Board em-
phasized that a student and university share a mutual interest in educational 
development, a mutual relationship interest foreign to collective bargaining 
and a true employment environment.41  The process of collective bargain-
ing, the Board explained, would harm the personal academic nature of the 
student-university relationship.42  The Board cautioned that, “From the 
standpoint of national labor policy, subjecting academic decisionmaking to 
collective bargaining is at best of dubious value because academic concerns 
are largely irrelevant to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment.”43  The egalitarian goals of collective bargaining run contrary to the 
hierarchical structure of higher education where professors and officials, 
with their superior experience and knowledge, know what is best for a stu-
dent’s academic growth.44  Lastly, the Board stated that collective bargain-
ing would impose on traditional values of academic freedom, like the rights 
of faculty to determine course requirements (materials, length, GPA stand-
ards, and exam rules) and of school officials to determine academic pro-
gression and dismissal standards.45 
2.  1999–2000: The Board Briefly Diverged from Precedent and 
Granted Employee Status to Student Petitioners 
In deciding the current NWU student athlete case, the RD used the 
common law master-servant test to find employee status under the Act.46  
The common law test is the only means by which the Board has found stu-
dent petitioners to be employees within this issue; however, the Board has 
only used this test in dissenting opinions and outlier cases.47 
                                                          
 38.  Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 252. 
 39.  Id. at 253. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 1003. 
 46.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *13 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. 
 47.  See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 254 (1976) (Fanning, Member, dis-
senting). 
  
2015] VARSITY BLUES 589 
The first time the common law master-servant test appeared in a Board 
decision concerning this issue was in a dissenting opinion by Member Fan-
ning in Cedars-Sinai.48  Fanning referred to the circular definition of Sec-
tion 2(3) as indicative of Congressional intent to invoke the ordinary mean-
ing of the term “employee,” that is, the common law “master-servant” 
meaning.49  Fanning quoted the common law definition of a servant as a 
“person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who 
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other’s control or right of control.”50  Using this definition, 
Fanning concluded that the interns and residents were employees.51  Fan-
ning similarly dissented in St. Clare’s.52 
The first time a majority of the Board accepted the common law test 
and found petitioning students to be employees under the Act occurred in 
Boston Medical Center.53  There, the Board overturned the RD and con-
cluded that although the petitioning medical interns and residents were 
there to learn, they were also employees under the Act.54  The petitioning 
students, like those in Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s, had graduated medical 
school and were in the mandatory residency program to practice their de-
sired medical specialty.55  Similar to how GAs split time between the class-
room and their duties, residency programs consist of both classroom lec-
tures by faculty and clinical training with patients.56  Unlike the GAs, 
however, the petitioners received compensation for their duties with salaries 
and benefits akin to hospital employees.57 
The Board in Boston Medical used the common law master-servant 
test to conclude that the petitioners were employees under Section 2(3).58  
                                                          
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.  Recall the circular 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term “employee” shall include any em-
ployee . . . .”). 
 50.  Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 254–55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 
(1957) (“A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform services in his affairs whose 
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control 
by the master.”)). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1009 (1977) (Fanning, Chairman, 
dissenting). 
 53.  Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999). 
 54.  Id. at 168. 
 55.  Id. at 153.  The Board therefore purported to overrule Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s in this 
decision.  Id. at 152. 
 56.  Id. at 153.  
 57.  Id. at 156. 
 58.  Id. at 160.  The Supreme Court, regarding the interpretation of “employee” under Section 
2(3), stated: “‘In the past, when Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we 
have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as 
understood by common-law agency doctrine.’  At the same time, when reviewing 
the Board’s interpretation of the term ‘employee’ as it is used in the Act, we have repeatedly said 
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By citing to Member Fanning’s dissent in Cedars-Sinai, the Board argued 
that when Congress uses “employee” as broadly as it did in Section 2(3), 
the common law test for its plain meaning is appropriate.59  The plain 
meaning of “employee,” the Board stated, is any person who works for an-
other, under their control, in return for compensation.60  Therefore, since the 
petitioners worked for Boston Medical, under its control, and received 
compensation, they were employees.61  The Board distinguished the peti-
tioners from traditional students by noting that they do not take classroom 
exams or receive grades; instead, their entire educational experience at Bos-
ton Medical is to gain sufficient clinical experience and knowledge to be-
come medical board-certified.62 
One year later, with Boston Medical as its support, the Board ruled that 
GAs at New York University (“NYU”) were employees under the Act.63  
The Board, as it did in Boston Medical, stressed that being primarily a stu-
dent does not preclude also being an employee under the Act.64  The Board 
cited to Supreme Court precedent in broadly interpreting the term “employ-
ee” in Section 2(3).65  By accepting the Supreme Court’s holding in Sure-
Tan, the Board opened statutory inclusion to anyone not explicitly listed in 
the exceptions to Section 2(3).66 
Consistent with Boston Medical and Member Fanning’s dissents, the 
Board employed the common law test to find that the GAs were employ-
ees.67  The Board reasoned that since the GAs performed duties under 
                                                          
that ‘[s]ince the task of defining the term “employee” is one that “has been assigned primarily to 
the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,” . . . the Board’s construction of that term is 
entitled to considerable deference.’”  NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 
(1995) (citations omitted). 
 59.  Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 160. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 161.   
 63.  N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1218 (2000). 
 64.  Id. at 1206; Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 161. 
 65.  N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 
85, 91–92 (1995) (upholding the Board’s broad and literal interpretation of “employee” in Section 
2(3) to include a worker who was also a paid union organizer); and Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 467 
U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (finding that only groups specifically exempted in Section 2(3) are ex-
cluded from coverage, therefore petitioning undocumented aliens are employees under the Act)).  
But see Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (finding that petitioning ship masters, mates, and pilots, who were not specifically exempt-
ed in Section 2(3), were nevertheless not employees).  In contrast with the student athlete issue, 
there was no dispute in Town & Country or Sure-Tan on whether the petitioners were in an em-
ployment relationship with their employer. 
 66.  N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205. 
 67.  Id. at 1205–06 (citing Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 93–95 (holding that an individ-
ual is an employee under the common law master-servant test when there is a relationship in 
which a servant performs services for another, under the other’s control, and in return for pay-
ment)).  
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NYU’s supervision for pay (financial aid), they were in a master-servant re-
lationship.68  The Board dismissed NYU’s contention that allowing the GAs 
to gain collective bargaining rights would infringe on academic freedoms, 
since it was simply giving the parties an opportunity to negotiate.69  The 
Board implied that there would be no negative effects from extending col-
lective bargaining rights to students by stating that in the thirty years since 
it first allowed faculty to form collective bargaining units, there had been no 
adverse effects on academic freedoms.70 
3.  2004–Present: The Board Quickly Returned to Its Precedent and 
Overruled NYU 
Four years later, the Board explicitly overruled NYU in Brown Univer-
sity.71  In doing so, the Board returned to the twenty-five years of case law 
preceding Boston Medical and found that GAs are primarily students in an 
educational relationship with their universities and not statutory employees 
in an economic relationship.72  The Board considered four factors in finding 
that the GAs were not employees: (1) the GAs’ status as students, (2) the 
role of their GA duties in graduate education, (3) the GAs’ relationship with 
the faculty, and (4) the financial aid the GAs received to attend Brown.73  
As to the first and second factors, unlike in NYU, the Board explained that 
most departments at Brown required graduate students to be a GA to obtain 
a degree.74  Third, faculty played an integral role in the GAs’ educational 
development.75  Lastly, all GAs generally received equal financial aid re-
gardless of the department, nature, quality, or amount of their work.76 
The Board conceded that Boston Medical claimed to overrule the deci-
sions in St. Clare’s and Cedars-Sinai, but it distinguished Boston Medical 
from its case at hand by the fact that the interns and residents in Boston 
Medical—unlike the GAs at Brown—had already graduated medical school 
                                                          
 68.  Id. at 1206. 
 69.  Id. at 1208.  The Board stated that the long history of the Act demonstrates that collective 
bargaining has been able to adjust to all sectors of the evolving economy.  Id. 
 70.  Id. (citing Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 164–65 (finding no evidence that collective 
bargaining would make the employees demand concessions that would interfere with the employ-
er’s educational mission)). 
 71.  Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). 
 72.  Id. at 483, 489.  This longstanding precedent, the Board noted, was never overturned in 
court or Congress.  Id. at 483. 
 73.  Id. at 489. 
 74.  Id. at 484–85, 488. 
 75.  Id. at 489. 
 76.  Id. at 484.  The GA tasks varied widely by department and did not influence the stipend 
amount.  The fellows did not partake in “services” under faculty guidance to receive their stipend, 
they simply completed a dissertation.  Id. 
  
592 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:583 
and were not degree-seeking students.77  Indeed, enrollment as a degree-
seeking Brown student was a prerequisite for the GAs’ financial aid consid-
eration.78 
The Board justified its return to pre-NYU precedent by reviewing the 
original intent of the Act and concluded that the fundamental premise of the 
Act was to cover economic—not educational—relationships.79  The Board 
cited to Congress’s failure to enact legislation contrary to its pre-NYU prec-
edent as evidence that Congress approved of GAs not being employees.80  
The Board thus analyzed Section 2(3) under the principle that “a reviewing 
court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision 
in isolation.”81  With these principles in mind, the Board rejected jurisdic-
tion over relationships that are primarily educational.82  The Board also re-
suscitated the St. Clare’s concerns over the detrimental effects that collec-
tive bargaining would have in an educational environment.83 
Brown, for the moment, resolved the issue that students performing 
traditional academic duties, like those of a GA, in return for financial aid 
packages are not employees of their university.84  Another group of students 
who perform duties in return for financial aid are student athletes.  Individ-
uals within this group, just as the GAs did before them, now seek the Board 
to approve their petition granting them employee status under the Act.  Dis-
tinct from the GA issue, however, disagreement exists regarding whether 
the student athletes’ duties are similarly intertwined with academics or are 
instead employment-based work. 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 483 n.4, 487.  Although the Board in Brown overruled NYU (which had relied on 
Boston in support of its conclusion), the Board decided to “express no opinion regarding the 
Board’s decision in Boston Medical Center,” likely because of how distinguishable the facts are 
from this one (degree seeking students vs. graduated students).  Id. at 483 n.4. 
 78.  Id. at 488. 
 79.  Id. at 487–89 (“[T]he mutual interests of the students and the educational institution . . . 
are predominantly academic rather than economic in nature.  Such interests are completely foreign 
to the normal employment relationship and . . . are not readily adaptable to the collective-
bargaining process.” (quoting St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 80.  Id. at 493. 
 81.  Id. at 488 n.23 (“The meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only be-
come evident when placed in context.  It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the 
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statu-
tory scheme.  A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory 
scheme.”  (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 82.  Id. at 487. 
 83.  Id. at 490 (“These decisions would include broad academic issues involving class size, 
time, length, and location, as well as issues over graduate assistants’ duties, hours, and stipends.  
In addition, collective bargaining would intrude upon decisions over who, what, and where to 
teach or research—the principal prerogatives of an educational institution like Brown.”). 
 84.  Id. at 483. 
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C.  The Regional Director in NWU Found Scholarship Football 
Student Athletes to be Employees under the Act 
In March 2014, the RD ruled on a first of its kind petition from a group 
of scholarship football student athletes (“SAs”)85 at Northwestern Universi-
ty.86  The SAs sought employee status under Section 2(3) of the Act for the 
opportunity to vote on whether to unionize and obtain collective bargaining 
rights.87  The RD granted their petition, determining that the SAs were em-
ployees within the meaning of the Act and directed them to vote on unioni-
zation.88  The Board granted review of the RD’s decision, halting the vote 
results until final resolution.89 
1.  Background to the Regional Director’s NWU Decision 
NWU, like Brown, NYU, Adelphi, and Stanford, is a private nonprofit 
university.90  It has nineteen varsity sports teams that participate in Division 
1 (“D1”) athletic competition in the Big-10 subdivision of the NCAA.91  
NWU recruits student athletes to its football team by offering financial aid 
scholarships that cover tuition, fees, room, board, and books.92  NWU gives 
these scholarships, referred to as “grant-in-aid” financial aid packages, to 85 
of the team’s 112 players, and each are valued at $61,000 per year.93  Each 
grant-in-aid recipient receives the same scholarship value, regardless of his 
position, skillset, or playing time.94  Unlike other universities that only pro-
vide yearly scholarships, NWU guarantees four-year scholarships.95 
                                                          
 85.  Throughout this Comment, the term “SAs” refers uniquely to scholarship football players 
at NWU whereas the broader term “student athletes” references that general category of student 
athletes at all universities. 
 86.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *2 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. Athletics Players Ass’n (Capa) Petitioner, at *1 (Apr. 24, 
2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.  The Board had not yet released its 
appeals decision at the time this Comment went to publication. 
 90.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *2 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. 
 91.  Id.  NWU has eight varsity sports teams for men and eleven for women.  Of the universi-
ties 8,400 overall students, 500 participate on these 19 teams.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 3. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id.  The only exception is that upperclassmen can elect to live off campus, in which case 
they are provided an additional monthly stipend to cover their living expenses valued between 
$1,200–$1,600.  Id.  
 95.  Id. at 3–4. 
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2.  The Regional Director Found the Student Athletes to be 
Employees Under the Act Using the Common Law Test 
The RD found that the SAs were employees under the Act by using the 
common law master-servant test.96  The RD asserted that since the SAs 
provide a service to NWU, for which they receive payment (financial aid), 
while subject to NWU’s control, they are employees.97  As proof that the 
SAs provide a service of value to NWU, the RD pointed to the fact that the 
football program generated $235 million in revenue and prestige from 
2003–2012.98  Regarding compensation, the RD declared that the scholar-
ships were compensation for the SAs’ athletic services.99  The RD stated 
that since the scholarship contracts do not permit the SAs to profit from 
their athletic abilities, the SAs are dependent on the scholarships for basic 
necessities.  This crucial fact, the RD noted, transformed the scholarship 
contracts into employment contracts, especially since the Head Coach can, 
with the Athletic Director’s approval, cancel a scholarship with cause.100  
He also stated, without explanation, that since each SA receives the same 
scholarship amount, the scholarship tender is an employment contract.101 
Concluding the common law test, the RD determined that the SAs 
were subject to extensive control by NWU in performance of their ser-
vices.102  There are numerous restrictions and responsibilities imposed on a 
SA, some imposed by the NCAA and others imposed by NWU.103  For ex-
                                                          
 96.  Id. at 13 (“[A]n employee is a person who performs services for another under a contract 
of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”).  
 97.  Id. at 14.  The RD maintained that walk-on (that is, non-scholarship) players were not 
employees since they do not sign a scholarship tender, thus entering into an employment contract 
with the university.  Despite participating in the same activities as the scholarship players and be-
ing subject to the same rules, the RD distinguished that the walk-ons “have nothing tying them to 
the football team except their ‘love of the game’ and the strong camaraderie that exists among the 
players.”  Id. at 17. 
 98.  Id. at 13. 
 99.  Id.  The RD did not find the fact that the scholarships were not taxable relevant to the 
inquiry.  Id. at 14. 
 100.  Id. at 15.  Causes for cancelling an SA’s scholarship include if the SA:  
(1) renders himself ineligible from intercollegiate competition; (2) engages in serious 
misconduct warranting substantial disciplinary action; (3) engages in conduct resulting 
in criminal charges; (4) abuses team rules as determined by the coach or athletic admin-
istration; (5) voluntarily withdraws from the sport at any time for any reason; (6) ac-
cepts compensation for participating in an athletic contest in his sport; or (7) agrees to 
be represented by an agent. 
Id. at 4.  In the past five years, only two SA scholarships have been cancelled at NWU (shooting a 
BB gun inside a university dormitory; repeated failure to comply with drug and alcohol policies).  
Id. 
 101.  Id. at 15. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 4–9.  Many of these restrictive rules are NCAA policy that the university must en-
force and abide by, but the RD maintained that, “The fact that some of these rules are . . . NCAA 
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ample, SAs must maintain a minimum GPA, make adequate degree pro-
gress, and receive their head coach’s permission to live off campus.104  Fur-
ther, by accepting a scholarship, SAs relinquish the right to profit from their 
name, image, or likeness while a student, and agree not to give interviews, 
not to gamble on sports, and to submit to drug and alcohol tests, among 
other rules.105  The RD also cited the academic-based mandatory participa-
tion in study halls and career development programs as evidence of the uni-
versity’s control over their lives.106 
The RD also referred to the strict schedules the SAs must adhere to 
during training camp, while traveling to games, and on game days as further 
proof of NWU’s extensive control over their lives.107  For example, the time 
commitment to football-related activities can fluctuate to as many as sixty 
hours per week and averages twenty-eight hours per week over the year.108 
Next, the RD explained that Brown did not apply, because the SAs are 
not primarily students, their football services are unrelated to educational 
requirements, faculty does not supervise them, and they do not receive fi-
nancial aid.109  The RD said the SAs are not primarily students since they 
spend more time on football-related activities than they do on their stud-
ies.110  This fact led to the RD’s second conclusion, that—unlike the GAs—
the SA services to the university are not a core element of their degree re-
quirements.111  In Brown, the GA duties garnered academic credit and were 
a prerequisite to receiving a graduate degree, but here, the RD explained, 
the SAs’ football services produce no academic credit and are not a degree 
requirement.112 
                                                          
rules does not detract from the amount of control the coaches exert over the players’ daily lives.”  
Id. at 16.  
 104.  Id. at 11, 16.  The GPA minimum raises from 1.8 as a second year to 2.0 by their fourth 
year.  For regular (non-athlete) students to continue to receive their financial aid package, they 
must have a 2.0 GPA by the end of their second year and thereafter.  NORTHWESTERN 
UNDERGRADUATE CATALOG 2014–15, at 15, available at 
http://www.registrar.northwestern.edu/courses/archive/nucat_2014_15/2014-
15_Undergraduate_Catalog.pdf. 
 105.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *5 (N.L.R.B Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.  Other restrictions deserving mention are that the play-
ers must accept Facebook friend requests from their coach, attend study halls under certain condi-
tions, wear team-issued outfits on game days, and live on campus during their first two years.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 16. 
 107.  Id. at 15–16. 
 108.  Id. at 5–9.  Twenty-eight is the average based on testimony; there are times of the year 
where it is much higher and much lower.  Transcript of Record at 345, Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. 
Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA) (2014) (Case 13-RC-121359). 
 109.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *18–20 (N.L.R.B Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.   
 110.  Id. at 18.  Compare with Brown, where the GAs spent only a limited time on their GA 
duties and were primarily focused on obtaining their graduate degree.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 19. 
 112.  Id. 
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The RD further distinguished Brown by noting that coaches, not facul-
ty, supervise the SAs in their services.113  Lastly, the RD distinguished fi-
nancial aid (like in Brown, which did not always require services), from 
scholarship compensation (like here, which does require ongoing athletic 
services to continue to receive the scholarship).114  The RD concluded his 
findings by ordering the SAs to vote on whether to form a union.115  On 
April 24, 2014, the Board accepted the university’s petition to grant review, 
to which twenty-four amicus briefs were filed.116 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The Board should reverse the RD’s decision that the SAs are employ-
ees under the Act because it departs from precedent and would adversely 
affect education quality.  In so ruling, the Board should hold that student 
athletes are not employees under Section 2(3), or, in the alternative, vacate 
the RD’s ruling and decline jurisdiction over the matter.  Analogous Board 
precedent shows that students like the SAs are not employees under the Act, 
but are instead primarily students.117  What is more, collective bargaining 
would infringe on academic freedoms to the detriment of the university’s 
educational mission.118  If affirmed, the RD’s decision would create nega-
tive unintended consequences, by creating separate classes of players and 
students with different rights within the same university, and by creating 
noncompliance with Title IX regulations—all while leading to a financially 
ruinous slippery slope of potentially labeling numerous other groups of stu-
dents “employees” with collective bargaining rights.119  For these reasons, 
and because the Board has limited jurisdiction over private universities, the 
Board should reverse the RD or decline jurisdiction so as to allow the 
NCAA to unilaterally enact change.120 
By declining jurisdiction, the Board will avoid fractured reforms that 
would upset competitive balance on the field and allow the NCAA to create 
reform in two areas.121  First, regarding licensing rights, the NCAA should 
allow student athletes to profit from the use of their image and likeness as 
prescribed in O’Bannon v. NCAA.122  Second, the NCAA should reempha-
                                                          
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 20.  
 115.  Id. at 23. 
 116.  Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. Athletics Players Ass’n (CAPA) Petitioner, Case 13-RC-
121359, at *1 (Apr. 24, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. 
 117.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 118.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 119.  See infra Part II.B. 
 120.  See infra Part II.C. 
 121.  See infra Part II.D. 
 122.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-17068 
(9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014). 
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size the “student” in student athlete by enacting rules that promote educa-
tional development in accordance with a university’s fundamental mis-
sion—to prepare the student for a successful career. 
A.  Governing Board Precedent Demonstrates That Student Athletes 
Are Not—and Were Never Meant to be—Employees of Their 
University 
Board precedent on this issue reveals that degree-seeking students who 
perform part-time duties for their university in order to receive financial aid 
are not employees because they are primarily students.  This precedent, 
which the RD in NWU mistakenly failed to follow, is what Brown reassert-
ed by overruling NYU and citing to Adelphi, Stanford, St. Clare’s, and Ce-
dars-Sinai.123 
1.  The Brown Four-Factor Test Demonstrates That the NWU 
Student Athletes Are Primarily Students 
An analysis of the four factors from Brown reveals that the SAs are not 
employees under the statutory test because (1) the SAs are primarily stu-
dents, (2) the scholarships the SAs receive are financial aid and not com-
pensation for services rendered, (3) the SAs’ participation in football has an 
educational element, and (4) the SAs participate in football under faculty 
supervision. 
a.  Student Athletes Are Primarily Students and Not Employees 
of Their University 
The SAs’ relationship with the university is primarily educational and 
not economic because their status as student athletes is contingent on being 
a degree-seeking student.  Perhaps the best indication of the fact that stu-
dent athletes are primarily there to obtain an education is that only 1.6% of 
college football players go on to play professionally.124  The statistics are 
even lower for men’s and women’s basketball.125  This statistic demon-
strates that students are in college to obtain a degree to use post-graduation, 
and are thus primarily students.  Since the SAs’ financial aid and eligibility 
to compete depends entirely on their status as degree-seeking students, they 
are primarily students.126  If the SAs were just employees there to provide 
                                                          
 123.  Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487, 491 (2004).  
 124.  NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF COMPETING IN ATHLETICS BEYOND 
THE HIGH SCHOOL INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL (last updated Sept. 24, 2013), available at 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Probability-of-going-pro-methodology_Update2013.pdf. 
 125.  Id.  Men’s basketball is 1.2% while women’s basketball is 0.9%.  Id. 
 126.  See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (“The graduate assistants are graduate 
students working toward their own advanced academic degrees, and their employment depends 
entirely on their continued status as such.”). 
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athletic services, then it would not matter how many (if any) credits they 
took in furtherance of a degree. 
The extent of NWU’s control over the SAs also indicates that they are 
primarily students, not employees.  The RD in NWU alleged that the uni-
versity and coaches subject the SAs to an enormous amount of control, in-
dicating an employment relationship.127  This characterization is misleading 
because all college students are subject to special rules imposed by their 
university.128  Moreover, it is the NCAA, not NWU, that imposes many of 
the rules cited by the RD.129  The fact that the RD found the SAs to spend 
more hours per week on football-related activities than traditional class-
room academic activities is not dispositive of them being employees.130  In 
fact, of the four NWU football players who testified in the NWU case, only 
one stated that he spent more time on football than on his studies.131  Never-
theless, in his decision, the RD chose to rely solely on that one player’s tes-
timony in concluding that all SAs spent more time on football.132  Moreo-
ver, testimony revealed that many of the rules are just paper tigers that are 
not actually enforced, which demonstrates that the extent of subjugation is 
not as draconian as some commentators allege.133 
The manner in which the university treats the SAs also indicates that 
they are primarily students.  The SAs do not enjoy employee benefits like 
vacation time, promotions, or benefit plans; instead, they are eligible for re-
sources limited to students, like running for student government positions, 
living in student housing, and accessing the student health center.134  As 
                                                          
 127.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *15–16 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. 
 128.  See, e.g., CONSOLIDATED USM AND UMD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, SECTION VI-
8.10A, UNIV. OF MD. (last updated May 2, 2013), http://www.president.umd.edu/policies/docs/VI-
810A.pdf (prohibiting smoking on campus at the University of Maryland, College Park); see also 
ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG POLICIES, AM. UNIV., available at 
http://www.american.edu/ocl/dos/upload/Alcohol-and-Other-Drugs-Policies.pdf (last visited Dec. 
16, 2014) (prohibiting alcohol consumption on campus regardless of age).  
 129.  NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 10.3 (regulating gambling), Art. 12.5.2 (mandating that 
student athletes cannot profit of their image or likeness), Art. 14.5 (regulating transfer eligibility), 
Art. 31.2.2 (regulating drug use and testing) (2009–2010).  These regulations are imposed by the 
NCAA, not NWU (the alleged employer). 
 130.  See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976) (“While the [petitioners] 
spend[] a greater percentage of their time in direct patient care [instead of in the classroom], this is 
simply the means by which the learning process is carried out.”).  See infra Part II.D.2 for further 
discussion of remedies to reform collegiate athletics. 
 131.  Transcript of Record at 177, supra note 108 (testimony of former NWU SA Theodis Col-
ter).  
 132.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *18. 
 133.  Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 1309–10 (testimony of former NWU SA Patrick 
Ward discussing that cell phone prohibitions on bus were not enforced, nor was the lights out rule 
in hotels when traveling). 
 134.  See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (holding that GAs were primarily stu-
dents because they were ineligible for promotion, faculty tenure, or employee fringe benefits but 
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former SA John Pace testified in NWU, “we had a plaque in the team meet-
ing room with our team goals.  And the number one goal is to earn a 
Northwestern degree.”135 
b.  The Student Athletes Receive Financial Aid to Attend NWU 
That SAs receive financial aid packages—not compensation for ser-
vices rendered—is further proof that they are primarily students and not 
employees.  Each SA receives the same value financial aid package, regard-
less of his team position, productivity, starter status, football skills, seniori-
ty, or the amount of time he devotes to the team.136  Since the amount of fi-
nancial aid the SAs receive is unrelated to the nature, duration, or quality of 
their work, it is unlike compensation for services in a true employment rela-
tionship and thus is financial aid.137  The value of a SA’s scholarship is 
fixed to the value of tuition, not his economic value as an employee.138  The 
Board in Brown resolved this issue in finding that the GAs received finan-
cial aid and not “consideration for work,” since all GAs received the same 
amount despite disparate obligations.139  Contrary to what pro-employee 
critics argue, the scholarship’s condition on athletic participation does not 
make it compensation.  Nearly all university scholarships are conditional on 
participation in an activity, academic performance, or remaining in good 
standing, and those scholarship recipients are not alleged to be employ-
ees.140 
c.  The Student Athletes’ Participation in Football Has an 
Educational Element 
The third element from Brown assessed the relationship between the 
students’ duties and their education.  The RD overlooked the important ed-
                                                          
were eligible for student government positions); see also The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 
N.L.R.B. 621, 622 (1974) (holding that GAs were primarily students because they did not get em-
ployee benefits but instead could access student health center and live in student dorms). 
 135.  Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 1278.  
 136.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *3.  Nor are their scholarships treated as taxable income as 
compensation is.  Id. 
 137.  See Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622 (finding that since there was no correlation between 
the work done and the amount received, the GAs were primarily students and not employees); see 
also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 252 (1976) (finding that since “[t]he amount of 
the stipend is not determined by the nature of the services rendered or by the number of hours 
spent in patient care,” the GAs were primarily students and not employees). 
 138.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *3.  
 139.  Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 488 (2004) (“We also emphasize that the 
money received by the [GAs] is the same as that received by fellows [who provide no services in 
return for their financial aid].  Thus, the money is not ‘consideration for work.’  It is financial aid 
to a student.”). 
 140.  See, e.g., General Scholarships, THOMAS MORE COLLEGE, 
http://www.thomasmore.edu/financial_aid/scholarships_freshman.cfm (last visited Dec. 16, 2014) 
(receiving a band scholarship is conditioned on actively participating in marching band). 
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ucational value of participating in collegiate athletics, which makes SAs 
primarily students.  The current U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, 
a former student athlete himself, recognized the educational value of colle-
giate athletics when he stated, “Student athletes learn lessons on courts and 
playing fields that are difficult to pick up in chemistry lab.  Resilience in the 
face of adversity, selflessness, teamwork, and finding your passion are all 
values that sports can uniquely transmit.”141  Supreme Court Justice Byron 
White, also a former student athlete, likewise stated, “Sports and other 
forms of vigorous physical activity provide educational experience which 
cannot be duplicated in the classroom.”142  Courts and scholarly commenta-
tors agree with Secretary Duncan and Justice White in recognizing the 
strong educational value of participating in collegiate athletics.143  Some 
commentators may swiftly dismiss this assertion, but in doing so they over-
look the premise that underlies the important value of experiential out-of-
class learning.144  Former NWU quarterback Theodis Colter, testifying in 
favor of unionization in the NWU case, alluded to the educational nature of 
sports and stated that football is more than just physical and is like “learn-
ing a new subject” and “a lot more mental than what people think.”145 
d.  The Student Athletes Participate in Football Under Faculty 
Supervision 
The remaining factor from Brown emphasized faculty and academic 
involvement in the GAs’ duties, an involvement that is also present in the 
case of the SAs at NWU.  On the record in NWU, former NWU SAs Doug-
las Bartels and Patrick Ward each testified that Head Coach Fitzgerald was 
equivalent to their other teachers at NWU in teaching life and academic 
skills.146  The athletic department at NWU also provides the SAs an aca-
                                                          
 141.  Arne Duncan, Let’s Clean up College Basketball and Football, HOME ROOM: THE 
OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 2010), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2010/01/lets-
clean-up-college-basketball-and-football/. 
 142.  Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protec-
tion of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 112 (2008). 
 143.  See Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of California at Davis, 816 F. Supp. 2d 869, 
874 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“The opportunity for students to participate in intercollegiate athletics is a 
vital component of educational development.”); see also, Steve Chen et al., The Effect of Sport 
Participation on Student-Athletes’ and Non Athlete Students’ Social Life and Identity, 3 J. ISSUES 
IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 176, 176 (2010) (“Physical educators and sports experts would 
agree that athletic participation brings numerous physiological, psychological, educational, and 
social benefits to the participants.”).  
 144.  See generally David A. Kolb, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE 
OF LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (2014). 
 145.  Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 106 –07. 
 146.  Id. at 1233, 1310, 1311 (“Q: Would you characterize Coach Fitzgerald or your other 
coaches as being among your teachers at Northwestern University?  A: Most definitely, yeah.  Q: 
[W]ould you say that you learned any lessons through the football program that helped you in 
your studies or helped you prepare for medical schools? A: Definitely [then discusses acquired 
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demic advisor to ensure their academic progress, further evincing the facul-
ty involvement in their football life.147  Some commentators might assert a 
false dichotomy where Coach Fitzgerald can be either a faculty professor or 
a boss, and since he is not the former, he must be the latter.  Reality, how-
ever, requires a more nuanced assessment.  Although Coach Fitzgerald’s 
supervision of the SAs’ football activities is not as traditionally faculty-
oriented as the relationship in Brown, it nevertheless provides an element of 
faculty supervision distinct from that of an employment relationship, since 
Coach Fitzgerald is not an adversarial boss, but an invested mentor. 
The SAs satisfy the four-factor test from Brown because they are pri-
marily students, who do not receive compensation for services rendered, 
who participate in an activity with an educational element, and who do so 
under faculty supervision. 
2.  Collective Bargaining Would Infringe on Areas of Traditional 
Academic Freedoms 
As discussed in the Board’s jurisprudence on this issue in decisions 
like Brown and St. Clare’s, collective bargaining is not appropriate for the 
academic nature of a student’s education.148  The personal relationship that 
a student has with his university is one with the mutual interest of educa-
tional success, foreign to that of a labor-employment relationship where 
conflicting economic interests exist.149  In a Supreme Court case involving 
the Board, the Court correctly discerned that “principles developed for use 
in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the academic 
world.’”150  As discussed above, Congress enacted the Act to cure industrial 
workplace tension and it is inappropriate in an educational environment.151  
Higher education is set up to be hierarchical, where learned professors and 
officials, with their superior knowledge and experience, decide what is best 
                                                          
skills such as time management, respecting other’s views, and working under pressure]”).  Id. at 
1233–34. 
 147.  Id. at 1300. 
 148.  Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 (2004) (noting that the concerns 
raised in St. Clare’s twenty-five years prior about the “deleterious impact” of collective bargain-
ing on education were still just as relevant). 
 149.  See St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977) (“In our view this 
is a very fundamental distinction for it means that the mutual interests of the students and the edu-
cational institution in the services being rendered are predominantly academic rather than eco-
nomic in nature.  Such interests are completely foreign to the normal employment relationship 
and, in our judgment, are not readily adaptable to the collective-bargaining process.”). 
 150.  N.L.R.B. v Yeshiva Univ., 444 US 671, 680–81 (1980) (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204 
N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)). 
 151.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
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for the students’ educational development.152  This system directly conflicts 
with the equity-driven goals of collective bargaining.153 
Collective bargaining would impair education quality by intruding up-
on decisions reserved for professional university officials.  Union repre-
sentatives should not be able to interfere with or influence how a university 
or its professors facilitate the higher learning process.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized a university’s fundamental right to “determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.”154  Essential university deci-
sions upon which collective bargaining could infringe are numerous, in-
cluding: GPA eligible minimums; grading standards; course content, length, 
and materials; attendance policies; graduation requirements; and dismissal 
standards.155  The rejection of union representatives as a mediator between 
the SAs and the university is not a rejection of student input in university 
affairs.  Students naturally deserve a voice in university operations, but 
those channels already exist in the likes of student government councils, 
where all students have a voice in their education.  It would certainly be ad-
verse to a meritocratic learning environment if a regular student sitting next 
to a student athlete in lecture were governed by different grading, attend-
ance, GPA, or credit hour standards.  Notwithstanding the extent to which 
this double standard may already exist in some universities, codifying it is 
not a proper solution.156 
Further, if permitted, collective bargaining would lead to an endless 
list of bargaining activities.  Athletics-related areas on this list include drug 
testing policies, punishments for breaking rules (such as underage drinking 
or missing practice), practice lengths, the ability to strike, or playing time.  
Not only would this create inherent unfairness among the non-scholarship 
players and regular students (who are devolved into a separate class of 
standards), but this would also create unfairness for opposing teams and it 
would usurp the NCAA’s role as the governing body to ensure uniformi-
                                                          
 152.  St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002. 
 153.  See id.  (“In addition to being ‘collective,’ the bargaining process is also designed to 
promote equality of bargaining power, another concept largely foreign to higher education.”). 
 154.  Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)) (discussing how 
the First Amendment has a special concern for a university’s freedom to make its own educational 
judgments).  
 155.  See St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003 (“Such freedoms [that could be infringed upon] 
encompass . . . such fundamental matters as the right to determine course length and content; to 
establish standards for advancement and graduation . . . .”).  
 156.  David Whitley, NCAA Shows Double Standard in Treatment of North Carolina Basket-
ball, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-
basketball/story/2012-09-24/north-carolina-academic-scandal-roy-williams-uconn (discussing the 
double standard in the “classic Keep-Jocks-Eligible Sham” that allowed football and basketball 
athletes to take sham courses without any disciplinary reaction). 
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ty.157  This type of collective bargaining would also infringe on the coach-
ing staff’s ability to use their collective superior experience and knowledge 
to create a positive football experience. 
Therefore, labeling SAs as employees with collective bargaining rights 
would be detrimental to the educational process in that it would remove 
power from the traditional and superior decision-making authorities and 
transfer it to labor union representatives who are concerned about econom-
ics, not educational development.  What is more, it could lead to unfair out-
comes where SAs are subject to different de jure academic standards than 
those of regular students.  Allowing SAs to collectively bargain would lead 
to the further degradation of their role as students and push them towards 
being purely economic employees, ultimately harming their learning pro-
cess, degree, and career. 
For the above reasons, the RD’s analysis is unsound and the Board 
should reverse it and hold that the SAs are primarily students and not em-
ployees.  In relying on the common law test, he deviated from Board prece-
dent clearly articulated in the Brown four-factor test for statutory analysis of 
Section 2(3).  A proper statutory analysis, as discussed above, demonstrates 
that the SAs are primarily students and that the educational environment for 
degree-seeking students is not appropriate for economic and employment 
policies accompanying collective bargaining.158  Despite the RD’s insist-
ence that the common law test determines the SAs to be employees, state 
courts employing a codified version of the common law for worker’s com-
pensation claims have rejected this conclusion.159  Courts resolving similar 
issues concerning fair labor and employment suits have likewise rejected 
student athletes being university employees.160  What is more, respondeat 
                                                          
 157.  For more discussion of infringement of collective bargaining on uniformity and fair play, 
see Part II.C. 
 158.  Nor should the RD have relied on the findings in the overturned Boston Medical decision, 
as that case is easily distinguishable from the SAs at NWU.  See Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 
N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004) (“Although the Board later overruled St. Clare’s Hospital and Cedars-
Sinai in Boston Medical Center, and asserted jurisdiction over the individuals there, those individ-
uals were interns, residents, and fellows who had already completed and received their academic 
degrees.  The Board in Boston Medical did not address the status of graduate assistants who have 
not received their academic degrees.  In the instant case, the graduate assistants are seeking their 
academic degrees and, thus, are clearly students.”  (emphasis added)). 
 159.  E.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288, 289–90 (Colo. 1957) (en 
banc) (denying worker’s compensation funds to a student athlete who was injured during athletic 
activities at his university because he was not an employee); Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of 
Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (same); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 
224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692, 702, 
707 (Tex. App. 2000) (same). 
 160.  E.g., Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1981) (comparing 
residence hall assistants to student athletes in concluding they are not employees of the university 
under federal Fair Labor and Standards Act); Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 
15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 759 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“No federal court has defied common sense by 
holding student athletes to be Title VII [of the 1964 Civil Rights Act] employees of their schools 
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superior tort claims against universities alleging liability for the actions of 
scholarship student athletes as “employees” have also failed.161  
B.  Adverse Unintended Consequences Would Result from Affirming 
the Regional Director’s Decision 
If scholarship football players were employees of their university, se-
vere unintended consequences would ensue, demonstrating how the unde-
veloped, rash, and imprudent nature of this course of action would result in 
unfairness, infeasibility, and potential illegality.  These adverse conse-
quences include the creation of two separate classes of players within the 
same team, the creation of a slippery slope for allowing nearly any group of 
students to become employees, and the potential for Title IX noncompli-
ance. 
1.  The Regional Director’s Decision Draws Arbitrary Lines and 
Creates a Slippery Slope for Designating Numerous Students as 
Employees 
In NWU, the fact that the SAs receive a scholarship as “compensation” 
for their services was crucial to satisfying the common law test.162  This 
finding, however, exposes the inherent unfairness in this decision—that the 
non-scholarship “walk-ons” cannot be eligible as employees since they re-
ceive no compensation.  The walk-on players do the same activities, for the 
same duration, under the same rules as the scholarship players, yet the RD’s 
ruling would relegate them to second-class status.163  The RD tried to reme-
dy a situation in which a group had no voice, but he exacerbated the prob-
lem.   An inadvisable reaction would be to label walk-ons as employees, 
despite their lack of compensation, bringing apparent fairness to the equa-
tion.  However, this position wanders further down the path of unintended 
consequences that fatally flaw the decision to include SAs as employees.  If 
the walk-ons—who receive no compensation and participate voluntarily in 
a profitable activity—could be employees of the university, then many oth-
                                                          
or an athletic association.”); Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 201 Cal. App. 4th 837 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (denying a race discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing 
Authority Act because the student athlete was not an employee of the university).   
 161.  E.g., Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 795 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Mass. 2003) 
(finding that a Boston University scholarship basketball player who punched an opponent was not 
an employee of the university for vicarious liability purposes); Korellas v. Ohio State Univ., 779 
N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (Ohio Misc. 2d 2002) (finding that an Ohio State University scholarship 
football player who punched a deliveryman was not an employee of the university).   
 162.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *14 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. 
 163.  Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 1269, 1270 (testimony of former NWU SA John 
Pace discussing how although his status changed from a walk-on to a scholarship player, he was 
subject to the same rules, practice schedules, standards and expectations during each phase). 
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er eligible students appear as potential employees.  Many university stu-
dents can fit into the RD’s common law category of employees, such as 
non-football student athletes, members of the band or debate team, and 
cheerleaders, raising the question of where this slippery slope drops off.  
Many of these students receive a scholarship in return for dedicating a sub-
stantial amount of time to particular activities that can generate revenue.  
Should these students thus become employees? 
The inherent unfairness in excluding the above students or walk-ons 
becomes even clearer with respect to non-football student athletes.  Many 
universities have other revenue generating sports (assuming that is the test, 
as the RD curiously seemed to suggest).164  Moreover, all scholarship stu-
dent athletes could be employees under the common law test, since they all 
receive compensation for services and are all subject to NCAA and univer-
sity rules.  The RD offers no guidance regarding where the line is drawn, if 
one even exists.  This runaway problem should be nipped in the bud by pre-
cluding all student athletes from becoming employees. 
Allowing all scholarship student athletes (or walk-ons too) to be em-
ployees would also be devastating to the educational environment.  Discon-
certingly, it would create two de jure classes of students—employee stu-
dents and normal students.  What is more, the total amount of benefits, 
including potential wages, that could be bargained for by so many student 
athletes would quickly bankrupt a university or force it to abandon academ-
ic priorities to stabilize its athletic department’s bloating budget.  In fact, 
last year, only 23 of the 1,200 NCAA member universities165 generated a 
profit within their athletic department.166  Indeed, universities are not over-
flowing with cash from college sports, and the average college loses four 
million dollars per year on athletics.167  This model would be unsustainable 
                                                          
 164.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *14 (emphasizing that the SAs provide a service of value 
that generates revenue as an important factor in the common law master-servant test).  For exam-
ple, the University of Denver men’s lacrosse team generated a profit last year.  Is it fair to not let 
them become employees, since they meet the RD’s common law test?  Is that fair to other NCAA 
lacrosse teams?  See Eben Noby-Williams, Notre Dame Brings Lacrosse’s Lowest Revenue into 
NCAA Semifinals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 24, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-23/notre-dame-brings-lacrosse-s-lowest-
revenue-into-ncaa-semifinals. 
 165.  NCAA Members by Division, NCAA, 
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/divisionListing (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 166.  Louanna Simon & Nathan Hatch, Why Unionizing College Sports is a Bad Call, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304441304579480013097853156. 





281301154084.html (“If you take the median profits of every sport the NCAA documented, the 
typical athletic program lost almost $4 million [in 2009].”). 
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and have terribly adverse effects on the academic priorities of a university.  
An attempt to make all student athletes employees could lead to the finan-
cial collapse of collegiate athletics. 
2.  The Regional Director’s Decision Could Create Illegal 
Noncompliance with Title IX Regulations 
The statute commonly referred to as Title IX168 mandates equal treat-
ment of both sexes in educational institutions,  and with respect to colle-
giate athletics, requires delineated equal expenditures and opportunities on 
factors such as equipment, travel per diems, medical services, and housing 
facilities.169  Labeling student athletes on a men’s team as employees with-
out doing so for a women’s team could lead to Title IX violations.170  In ad-
dition, a unionized football team could eventually bargain for so many ben-
efits that the result would be only two male sports teams (football and 
basketball) and enough women’s sports teams necessary to maintain Title 
IX compliance, eliminating all other male sports teams.171  Raising benefits 
for all men and women’s teams altogether, although ensuring aggregate 
equality, would also lead to runaway financial budgets. 
C.  If the Board Does Not Reverse the Regional Director, It Should 
Alternatively Decline Jurisdiction over the Issue and Allow the 
NCAA to Resolve It 
Collective bargaining and its adversarial union process is not the prop-
er vehicle in which to reform collegiate athletics—the NCAA is.172  The 
Act allows the Board to exercise discretion and decline jurisdiction over 
matters where the labor dispute’s effect on commerce is not substantial 
enough to warrant jurisdiction.173  This issue requires such discretion for 
                                                          
 168.  20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 169.  34 C.F.R. §§ 106.41(c)(1)–(10) (2008). 
 170.  For example, if the SAs at NWU bargained for particular terms and conditions such as 
increased travel per diems, newer equipment, or expanded medical coverage, then the university 
would have to decrease its spending on other male sports to maintain equal aggregate expenditures 
with women’s sports to avoid violating Title IX. 
 171.  See Kristin Rozum, Staying Inbounds: Reforming Title IX in Collegiate Athletics, 18 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 155, 156 (2003) (“The most significant unintended consequence [of Title IX] has 
been the creation of a quota system, which has caused male sports to be eliminated from collegiate 
athletic programs.”); see also Michael Rosen, Constitutional Implications of Title IX Compliance 
in Colleges and Universities, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 503, 504 (2012) (discussing how Title 
IX compliance disproportionately eliminated men’s sports at James Madison University).  
 172.  See infra Part II.D. 
 173.  29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012) (“The Board, in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert ju-
risdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opin-
ion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to 
warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction . . . .”); see also New York Racing Ass’n Inc. v. NLRB, 708 
F.2d 46, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming the Board’s decision to decline jurisdiction over horse 
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two reasons: first, the Board does not wield enough legal influence to truly 
remedy this issue, and second, trying to do so would only further compli-
cate the matter. 
1.  The Board Does Not Wield Enough Influence to Successfully 
Remedy This Issue 
The Board only retains jurisdiction over private universities, which 
comprise 17 of the 125 total D1 Football Bowl Subdivision174 (“FBS”) uni-
versities.175  Even if the Board were to label all football student athletes as 
employees with collective bargaining rights, seventy-six percent of teams 
would remain unaffected.  The Board would benefit from exercising the 
cardinal maxim of judicial restraint that “if it is not necessary to decide 
more, it is necessary not to decide more.”176  Given the Board’s limited 
scope of authority, the NCAA is more able to achieve comprehensive re-
form. 
There is strong evidence that the NCAA and its member universities 
are the most effective bodies to enact reform.  Recently, each Pacific-12 and 
Big-10 conference university president agreed to guarantee four-year schol-
arships to all student athletes, to allow former student athletes to return and 
finish their degrees later in life, to improve medical coverage, and to in-
crease the value of scholarships.177  If the Board had mandated any of these 
changes, only three of those twenty-six universities would have been 
bound.178  Similarly, the NCAA itself recently modified its rules to guaran-
tee unlimited meals and snacks to all student athletes instead of only three 
meals per day, demonstrating its willingness for unilateral reform.179  By 
punting on this issue, the Board will appropriately heed to the bodies that 
can actually effect broad change on the issue. 
                                                          
racing despite that the racing activities “affect interstate commerce and generate hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in gross income.”).  
 174.  FBS universities make up the top level division of NCAA college football. 
 175.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (federal and state entities are not subject to the Board’s 
jurisdiction).  Courts have also found religious schools exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction.  
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1979); Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB, 
558 F.3d 568, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 176.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 431 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 177.  Ben Strauss, Big Ten Joins Pac-12 in Pressing the N.C.A.A. to Make Changes, N. Y. 
TIMES (June 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/sports/ncaafootball/big-ten-joins-
pacific-12-in-pressing-ncaa-for-changes.html?_r=2.  
 178.  The only private universities in those conferences are Northwestern University, Universi-
ty of Southern California, and Stanford University.  See PAC-12 Conference, www.pac-12.com 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Big-10 Conference, www.bigten.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 179.  Michelle Hosick, Council approves meals, other student-athlete well-being rules, NCAA 
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/council-approves-meals-
other-student-athlete-well-being-rules.  
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2.  Any Change the Board Can Create Would Further Complicate 
the Issue and Disrupt Competitive Balance Within Athletic 
Competition 
The Board should decline jurisdiction over this issue because, as it 
cannot bind public universities to its decisions, any Board rulings will have 
the effect of creating a multi-tiered system where not all universities are 
subject to the same rules.  The situation would create an unfair disparity be-
tween the rules by which opposing teams abided, breaking the fundamental 
NCAA tenet of competitive balance.180  If private university football play-
ers could bargain with their universities for different standards, rights, and 
rules, but their opponents from a public university could not, the former 
would gain an unfair advantage. 
a.  Maintaining Competitive Balance Is Fundamental to 
Collegiate Athletics 
Ensuring uniform rules and compliance is fundamental to the populari-
ty and legitimacy of collegiate athletics.  Fans are drawn to college football 
because of the parity, but this equilibrium would be destroyed if the Board 
allowed some teams to be subject to different rules than the other.181  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that “most of the regulatory controls of the 
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athlet-
ic teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest 
in intercollegiate athletics.”182  Fair competition is stifled if certain union-
ized teams can write their own rules to which other teams are not subject.  
Collective bargaining is appropriate for traditional labor competition but is 
unsuitable for collegiate athletics where every team is supposed to operate 
under uniform rules. 
The possibility of unfair circumstances arising is easy to foresee.  Per-
haps private university players bargain with their university to reduce the 
number of credit hours needed for eligibility, giving them more free time 
than their public university opponents to train and prepare for games.  Per-
haps they bargain for more free tickets, wages, or a lower minimum GPA 
standard, unfairly enticing top recruits to their school to the disadvantage of 
a public university that is tied to its state’s labor laws.  Moreover, if private 
university players unionize and go on strike until the university pays them 
                                                          
 180.  NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 2.10 (2009–2010). 
 181.  See Jeffrey P. Gleason, From Russia with Love: The Legal Repercussions of the Recruit-
ment and Contracting of Foreign Players in the National Hockey League, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 
617 (2008) (“[T]he establishment of a uniform set of rules and policies promotes parity among 
teams and thereby creates a better product for sports fans . . . .”). 
 182.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (discussing televi-
sion rights regulations); see also Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“All agree that cooperation off the field is essential to produce intense rivalry on 
it—rivalry that is essential to the sport’s attractiveness . . . .”).  
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wages as employees, the university would be confronted with a Hobson’s 
choice.  If the university acted and gave into the union demands, they would 
face sanctions for breaching NCAA policies on amateurism, but if the uni-
versity took no action and refused to negotiate, they would face Board sanc-
tions for unfair labor practices.  These examples show that the NCAA, with 
its comprehensive control, is the appropriate body for reform—not the 
Board. 
b.  Many States Prohibit Public Employees from Collective 
Bargaining 
Many state legislatures prohibit public employees from collective bar-
gaining.  This fact demonstrates that even if all fifty states were to recog-
nize student athletes as employees, many student athletes would still be un-
able to collectively bargain, putting them at an unfair disadvantage to those 
who can.  This fact underscores how the NCAA would be the ideal body to 
enact reform since it can enforce change binding on all D1 FBS universi-
ties.  State legislatures are limited to controlling labor practices only for 
public employees within their own state—a problem similar to why the 
Board is unfit to address this issue.  Ohio and Michigan, in response to the 
NWU decision, preempted the final Board decision and passed legislation 
specifying that student athletes at state universities are not employees under 
state law.183  Many other states prohibit state employees from collective 
bargaining and unionization.184  The Board has no power to tell state legis-
latures which public employees can collectively bargain, meaning that its 
decision could create an unwieldy situation wherein student athletes are 
thrust into the disarray of state labor laws as employees. 
In contrast to Ohio and Michigan, the Connecticut State Legislature 
proposed a bill in January 2015 that would designate revenue-generating 
student athletes at public universities as employees with collectively bar-
gaining rights.185  Aside from the reasons set forth in Part II.B against this 
type of fragmented and unfair reform, this bill perturbingly codifies a reve-
nue-generating quota requirement for purposes of employment determina-
tion. 
                                                          
 183.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.56 (2014), available at http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/3345 
(effective Sept. 15, 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.201 (2014), available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/publicact/pdf/2014-PA-0414.pdf (effective 
Dec. 30, 2014). 
 184.  E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 95-98 (Lexis 2013) (state public employees cannot collec-
tively bargain); Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-57.2 (Lexis 2013) (same); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann § 617.002 
(West 2011) (same). 
 185.  H.B. 5485, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015).  The bill would only allow employee status to stu-
dent athletes who receive a scholarship that covers at least 90% of tuition and is materially related 
to the student’s participation in collegiate sports, and if the revenue generated by the student’s 
sport exceeds 400% of the student’s scholarship value.  Id. 
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The RD’s efforts, although perhaps noble, would simply create chaos.  
If, however, the NCAA unilaterally enacted change and the Board declined 
jurisdiction over the employee issue, no university would face the dilemma 
of possible sanctions for violating NCAA policy or breaching state labor 
laws.  Intercollegiate athletics requires all teams to operate under uniform 
terms and conditions to maintain a competitive balance, and neither the 
Board nor state legislatures can achieve this result because of their limited 
authority.  The Board should decline jurisdiction because, as Justice Bren-
nan once stated, “the Board has recognized that principles developed for use 
in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the academic 
world.’”186 
D.  Proposed Remedies for Reforming Collegiate Athletics 
Given the imprudence of any Board involvement, there is little ques-
tion that the NCAA is the best candidate to reform collegiate athletics and 
tackle this issue.  Although instances of universities exploiting student ath-
letes and providing sham educations are unacceptable, as the RD failed to 
see in NWU, one must remember that the shortest line to a more desirable 
outcome is not necessarily the most legitimate or effective means of achiev-
ing that outcome.  For an issue as large and complex as reforming collegiate 
athletics, a more thoughtful, deliberate, and comprehensive plan is need-
ed—not a knee-jerk reaction that will cause more harm than good.  In its 
core values, the NCAA purports to strive for “excellence in both academics 
and athletics” and commitment to the “supporting role that intercollegiate 
athletics plays in the higher education mission.”187  The game plan is sound, 
now the NCAA must execute it. 
Colleges Exploit Student Athletes, run the sad-but-true headlines.188  
The main contentions are: (1) colleges coerce student athletes into waiving 
their rights to profit from their own image, and (2) colleges fail to provide 
student athletes with a true higher education.  In some cases, these allega-
tions are disturbingly true.  Indeed, to comply with NCAA rules, universi-
ties force recruits to sign away the right to profit from their name, image, or 
likeness while enrolled at the university in order to receive their scholar-
ship.189  Further, recent reports about the University of North Carolina 
                                                          
 186.  NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681 (1980) (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204 
N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)). 
 187.  NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2014). 
 188.  E.g., Ellen Staurowsky, How Colleges Exploit Student-Athletes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/09/how-colleges-exploit-student-
athletes/244945/; Sally Kohn, How college sports cheat student athletes, CNN (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/27/opinion/kohn-college-sports-cheat-student-athletes/. 
 189.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-
17068 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014). 
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(“UNC”) failing to truly educate its student athletes reveal that an insuffi-
cient emphasis on education is becoming all too common.190 
The plan for reform should: (1) allow student athletes the right to prof-
it from their own likeness, and (2) reemphasize the academic purpose of be-
ing a student athlete.  The NCAA and universities can bolster the assertion 
that student athletes are primarily students in several important ways.  The 
NCAA should expand its authority to regulate the hours student athletes de-
vote to their sport, guarantee scholarships until graduation, improve medical 
care coverage for injured players, improve academic support programs and 
standards, and reform admissions standards to ensure that student athletes 
are being properly educated at the right place. 
1.  Student Athletes Deserve the Right to Profit from Their Name, 
Image, or Likeness 
The federal district court ruling in O’Bannon v. NCAA presents a fair 
remedy to the issue of unfair profiteering by universities.191  O’Bannon is a 
class action lawsuit on behalf of former D1 and FBS college men’s basket-
ball and football players against the NCAA.192  The court ruled for the 
plaintiffs, finding that the NCAA and universities unlawfully restrained 
trade in violation of antitrust laws in fixing the amount of compensation 
student athletes can receive at the value of a grant-in-aid scholarship.193  
This restrictive rule forced recruits to waive their likeness rights to get a 
scholarship, thus barring compensation from exceeding that of a grant-in-
aid scholarship.194 
The court prescribed two remedies for the antitrust violation that, if 
upheld on appeal, will properly reform collegiate athletics.  First, it en-
joined the NCAA from enforcing its rule that prohibited universities from 
offering recruits shares of licensing revenue in excess of the value of a 
grant-in-aid scholarship.195  Ideally, the procompetitive effect of this reme-
                                                          
 190.  Philip Victor, UNC Scandal Illuminates Collegiate Fumbles on Student-Athlete Educa-
tion, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Oct. 23, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/23/unc-
scandal-athletes.html. 
 191.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955.  Oral arguments for the appeals case are scheduled for 
March 17, 2015.  Oral Argument Dates & Locations, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/calendar/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 192.  Id. at 965. 
 193.  Id. at 988.  A full grant-in-aid scholarship includes tuition, fees, books, room, and board.  
Id. at 965. 
 194.  Id. at 988. 
 195.  Id. at 1007–08.  Since the court enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting universities from 
offering recruits licensing revenue shares, this simply means that universities are not compelled to 
do anything at all.  Although the NCAA can cap the excess amount that universities offer, that cap 
cannot be below the cost-of-attendance, which is typically a few thousand dollars higher than the 
grant-in-aid bar and covers other school-related expenses like school supplies and transportation.  
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dy would increase the overall value of scholarships, because as one univer-
sity increases scholarship values, other universities will follow suit in order 
to remain competitive contenders for top recruits.196 
The court’s second remedy enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting uni-
versities from establishing trust funds containing a share of licensing reve-
nue for the use of a student athlete’s name, image, or likeness, payable once 
the student athlete leaves the university.197  The trust fund would compen-
sate the student athlete for the university’s profits off their likeness in tele-
vision game broadcasts and merchandise sales.198  The trusts must be for a 
minimum of $5,000 per year of each student athlete’s eligibility.199  To pre-
serve amateurism, the NCAA can still prohibit the student athlete from us-
ing those trust funds while in school.200 
The court, citing the need for the NCAA to protect its student athletes 
from commercial exploitation, denied the plaintiff’s proposed remedy of al-
lowing them to receive money for endorsements while students.201  NCAA 
bylaws prohibit players from product endorsement compensation,202 but it 
would be wise to remove this restriction for two reasons.  First, the money 
paid to the student athletes would flow from third parties instead of the uni-
versity, thus relieving the university of any financial burden, and second, it 
would eliminate Title IX issues. 
The two O’Bannon remedies satisfactorily balance the troubling notion 
of colleges unjustly profiting off a student athlete’s likeness to their exclu-
sion while also limiting runaway spending.  Although the O’Bannon reme-
dies are limited to college men’s football and basketball student athletes, 
those are the only two revenue-generating programs at most universities.203  
                                                          
Id. at 971–72, 1008.  Essentially, this remedy allows universities to provide stipends to “top off” 
the difference between grant-in-aid scholarships and the true cost of attendance.  Id. at 982–83. 
 196.  Keeping in mind the NCAA’s sacred goal of competitive balance, the court allowed the 
NCAA to cap the scholarship compensation amount under this scheme, as long as the cap is above 
that university’s cost of attendance.  Id. at 1008.  This cap would prevent the smaller schools from 
losing a financial arms race to bigger and richer universities in attracting recruits. 
 197.  Id.  Note that the fund is payable upon leaving the university and does not necessarily 
require graduation.  Id. at 982.  
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id.  Moreover, each player on the same team must receive the same amount each year.  
Id. 
 200.  Id.  Note that the O’Bannon remedies apply to all D1 FBS men’s basketball and football 
student athletes, whereas the NWU Board case narrowly involved scholarship football student ath-
letes at Northwestern University. 
 201.  Id. at 984. 
 202.  NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 12.5.2.1 (2009–2010). 
 203.  See Kristi A. Dosh, Latest NCAA Report Shows Gap Between Haves and Have-Nots, FOX 
SPORTS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/outkick-the-coverage/latest-
ncaa-report-shows-gap-between-haves-and-have-nots-082014#fb-root (“Football and men’s bas-
ketball continue to be the two sports athletic departments have to rely upon to drive the depart-
ment’s revenue.”). 
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The revenue producing programs subsidize the dozens of other expensive 
sports programs that D1 universities offer.204  What is more, only 7 of the 
230 public D1 universities did not subsidize their athletic department’s 
budget with student fees, institutional, and state support in 2013.205 
Early signs indicate that the O’Bannon remedies are receiving support.  
University of Texas Athletic Director Steve Patterson has already embraced 
the O’Bannon ruling.206  Patterson announced that if O’Bannon is upheld on 
appeal, the university would spend six million dollars per year investing in 
both the cost-of-attendance stipend and trust fund remedy.207  This an-
nouncement encouragingly shows that universities are willing to implement 
the voluntary O’Bannon remedies to more student athlete teams than were 
even involved in the case.208  As universities like Texas offer recruits these 
incentives, other universities will likely follow suit to remain competitive, 
thus increasing overall benefits. 
Indeed, O’Bannon’s cost-of-attendance goal saw progress before the 
case reached the court of appeals.  At an annual meeting in January 2015,209 
                                                          
 204.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *13 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 (“In addition, the profit realized from the football team’s 
annual revenue is utilized to subsidize the Employer’s non-revenue generating sports (that is, all 
the other varsity sports with the exception of men’s basketball).”). 
 205.  College Sports Finances Chart, USA TODAY (June 4, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/10/college-athletic-department-revenue-
database-methodology/2150123/.  Since the NCAA does not release this type of data, the only 
data available is for public universities.  Nor is the NCAA retaining an exorbitant amount of reve-
nue, as it redistributes over ninety percent of revenue back to the universities.  Simon & Hatch, 
supra note 166.  Recall that universities already provide scholarship student athletes with an im-
mensely valuable free education.  See, e.g., NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *3 (SA’s four-year 
scholarship value is $244,000).  Any time a call is made for increased student athlete benefits, one 
should cautiously consider how much the athletic-related expenses would siphon funds from aca-
demic expenses, harming the university’s primary purpose. 
 206.  Michael A. Lindenberger, Texas Athletic Director: With New Rules, Longhorns Would 
Pay Each Player $10,000, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/headlines/20141021-texas-athletic-director-
with-new-rules-longhorns-will-pay-each-player-10000.ece. 
 207.  Id.  The university would provide $10,000 total to each male and female student athlete, 
$5,000 to cover expenses not covered by the traditional grant-in-aid scholarships and $5,000 for 
the likeness trust fund.  John Taylor, Texas Could Pay Student-Athletes 10K Annually, NBC 
SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/10/22/texas-to-pay-student-
athletes-10k-annually/. 
 208.  Recall that O’Bannon was a class action lawsuit only on behalf of former men’s basket-
ball and football players.   
 209.  The NCAA D1 Board of Directors recently voted 16–2 to allow the Power Five confer-
ences greater autonomy in dealing with student athlete “welfare” issues so that they can change 
rules without NCAA approval or involving the 75 non-Power Five member universities.  Brian 
Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-
power-conferences.   
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the “Power Five”210 conferences voted 79–1211 in favor of allowing Power 
Five member universities to voluntarily expand scholarship maximums 
from grant-in-aid to that of the cost-of-attendance.212  The Power Five also 
narrowly voted in favor of legislation that precludes universities from not 
renewing a student athlete’s scholarship for athletic reasons.213  Encourag-
ing signals from the University of Texas and Power Five conferences hint 
that the O’Bannon appeals court may end up codifying the status quo more 
than it initially foresaw. 
2.  Universities Should Put the Student Back in Student Athlete 
(Emphasis Needed) 
Second, the NCAA needs to enact reform to give student athletes the 
proper educational focus that a university student expects and deserves.  
Front and center on the NCAA homepage, a textbox reads, “Student-athlete 
success on the field, in the classroom, and in life is at the heart of our mis-
sion.”214  If the NCAA and its members truly believe that, they need to do 
more to show that the label “student athlete” is more than an empty catch-
phrase.  Unlike the Board or any state legislature, the NCAA has exclusive 
authority to efficiently and effectively institute the type of reforms that 
would reaffirm education as the primary goal of each NCAA member uni-
versity.  Contrary to the website’s claim, a cursory glance of news headlines 
reveals that the problem of universities failing to satisfactorily educate stu-
dent athletes is widespread and long-standing.215  To fix this problem, the 
                                                          
 210.  The Power Five conferences consist of the ACC, Big-10, Big-12, Pac-12, and SEC (plus 
the University of Notre Dame).  Id. 
 211.  The 65 Power Five member universities each get one vote and each of the five confer-
ences gets three votes.  Boston College cast the lone dissenting vote and released a statement ex-
pressing concern at increasing expenses spent on student athletes at the detriment of allocating 
resources for need-based students in the general student body.  Michael Sullivan, BC Athletics 
Votes Alone in Dissent of Full Cost of Attendance Scholarship Measure, BC HEIGHTS (Jan. 18, 
2015), http://bcheights.com/news/2015/bc-athletics-votes-alone-dissent-full-cost-attendance-
scholarship-measure/. 
 212.  Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value of Scholarship in Historic Vote, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaa-convention-cost-
of-attendance-student-athletes-scholarships/21921073/.  The new rules resulting from the vote go 
into effect August 1, 2015.  Id.  For discussion of the “cost-of-attendance” vs. “grant-in-aid” 
scholarship value see supra note 195.   
 213.  Berkowitz, supra note 212. 
 214.  NCAA HOMEPAGE, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).  
 215.  In the decade of the 2000s alone, the NCAA punished 15 of the 120 FBS universities for 
“serious” academic fraud violations.  Doug Lederman, Half of Big-Time NCAA Programs Had 
Major Violations, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-02-07-ncaa-infractions_N.htm.  As a more 
specific example, only forty-four percent of men’s basketball players at leading programs graduate 
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NCAA should expand its authority to regulate the time student athletes ex-
pend on sports, guarantee scholarships until graduation, improve medical 
care coverage, and reform education and admissions standards to ensure 
that student athletes are being properly educated at the right institution. 
The NCAA should expand its authority to regulate the amount of time 
that student athletes can devote to athletic-related activities.216  By expand-
ing the definition of regulated athletic activities, the NCAA could reduce 
the maximum weekly hours spent on sports and provide student athletes 
more time to focus on their studies.  The NCAA would then have increased 
powers to sanction offending universities that stretch the rules and over-
work players.  Notably, this change would have no adverse effect on com-
petitive balance among the teams, because each team would equally spend 
less time practicing. 
There are two simple but demonstrative financial steps the NCAA and 
its member universities should take to reinforce their commitment to aca-
demics over athletics.  The first step is to guarantee each student athlete 
their scholarship until they graduate,217 like some conferences and universi-
ties have already done.218  This action would prevent a student from losing 
his scholarship due to an athletic injury.219  Second, the NCAA should 
compel universities to pay for all sports-related medical bills.220  The 
NCAA can prove it is serious about academics by implementing these steps 
so that student athletes can focus on what is important in the classroom 
                                                          
 216.  Current NCAA bylaws mandate that when student athletes are “in-season,” they cannot 
engage in countable athletically related activities (“CARAs,” defined as “any required activity 
with an athletics purpose involving student-athletes and at the direction of, or supervised by one or 
more of an institution’s coaching staff”) exceeding four hours per day and twenty hours per week.  
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 17.02.1, 17.1.6.1 (2009–2010).  Testimony from the NWU case 
revealed SAs spent forty to fifty hours per week on football during the season, since they did not 
all count as CARAs.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *6 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.  These activities include “voluntary” (in 
name only) drills nominally organized by the quarterback, time spent traveling to games, medical 
check-ins, and mandatory training meetings.  Id. at 6 n.11.  If the NCAA expanded § 17.02.1 to 
include all of these activities and actually enforced the twenty hour per week limit, or better yet 
lowered it, student athletes would have sufficient time to focus on their studies like their non-
athlete peers.  By encompassing more activities under CARA, the competitive balance would like-
ly become more fair, since teams could no longer easily engage in activities outside CARA. 
 217.  Any scholarship guarantee should still be subject to violating NCAA/university rules of 
conduct or voluntary withdrawal.  
 218.  See Strauss, supra note 177 (discussing reforms to the PAC-12 and Big-10 Conferences); 
see also NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *15 (discussing NWU’s guarantee of four-year scholar-
ships).  Many universities, however, still renew scholarships for student athletes on a yearly basis.  
Id. 
 219.  E.g., Brian Montopoli, Kevin Ware Injury Could Put Scholarship at Risk, CBS NEWS 
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/kevin-ware-injury-could-put-scholarship-at-risk/. 
 220.  The NCAA insurance deductible for catastrophic injuries is $90,000, leaving many stu-
dent athletes unable to pay their medical bills for injuries sustained in the course of athletic play.  
E.g., Kristina Peterson, College Athletes Stuck with the Bill After Injuries, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/sports/16athletes.html?_r=0.  
  
616 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:583 
without being burdened by financial risks stemming from their athletic par-
ticipation. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge in overhauling the current system is to 
make universities treat academic progression as a reality and not just an ob-
stacle.  A recent report detailed a troublingly apathetic academic system at 
UNC where professors, advisors, coaches, associate deans, and other offi-
cials conspired to cheat thousands of student athletes out of a true education 
by skating them through fake classes and allowing artificial grades for over 
two decades, just to keep them eligible for competition.221  The amount of 
university officials complicit in academic fraud scandals violates the pillars 
of intellectual growth and integrity on which institutions of higher learning 
stand.  Scholars maintain that a university has a fiduciary duty to its stu-
dents, a duty of care and loyalty to use good faith in selflessly providing 
them an exceptional education.222  Unfortunately, universities often fail to 
make good on this duty to student athletes. 
To remedy this systemic corruption, NCAA sanctions need to be se-
vere enough to make offending universities never contemplate fraud again 
while deterring other universities from speculating about the probable value 
of skirting rules to maintain player eligibility.  The NCAA also must create 
an independent oversight body to monitor academic fraud and abandon its 
current practice of allowing the universities themselves to self-report aca-
                                                          
 221.  Sara Ganim & Devon M. Sayers, UNC Report Finds 18 Years of Academic Fraud to 
Keep Athletes Playing, CNN (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/unc-report-
academic-fraud.  A similar scandal recently occurred at Florida State University.  Lynn Zinser, 
N.C.A.A. Penalizes Florida State for Academic Fraud, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/sports/ncaafootball/07ncaa.html?_r=0 (involving a situation 
where academic advisors, tutors, and learning specialists provided sixty student athletes with ex-
am answers, typed portions of papers, and took tests in their place).  These examples are just the 
recently emerged tip of the iceberg.  See Lederman, supra note 215 (discussing that serious viola-
tions of academic rules at FBS universities doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s).  Universities 
face serious pressure to win and serious consequences for losing, so when one college engages in 
academic fraud to keep its players eligible, other schools feel pressured to do the same.  ANDREW 
A. ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
SPORTS 4 (1999) (“And when one [NCAA] school cheats, others feel compelled to do the same.”). 
 222.  See, e.g., Richard Salgado, Educating Someone Who Can’t or Doesn’t Want to Be Edu-
cated: The Shifting Fiduciary Duty Continuum of Big-Time College Sports, 3 WILLAMETTE 
SPORTS L.J. 27, 29 (2006) (noting that some commentators have recently suggested a fiduciary 
duty exists in a university setting); Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework 
for Understanding and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 
159, 160, 163 (2005) (stating that historically, the student-teacher relationship has been viewed as 
a fiduciary one); Kent Weeks and Rich Hagland, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Fac-
ulty and Administrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 153, 154–55 (2002) (discussing the applicability of fidu-
ciary relationships to the student-teacher relationship).  But see Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 
410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting student athlete’s claim that the university committed educa-
tional malpractice by failing to provide a meaningful education). 
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demic fraud,223 which merely leads to obvious conflicting interests and fa-
cilitates underreporting.224 
The NCAA can address one root of the academic fraud problem by be-
ing tougher on admission standards for student athletes.  The NCAA should 
reform admissions standards by enforcing SAT percentile ranges that all 
admitted student athletes must fall between, consistent with that universi-
ty’s student body.  The effect of this policy would be that students unquali-
fied to meet the rigors of a particular university would not be set up to fail 
by being in over their head in their studies.225  If a student athlete cannot 
keep up with his or her studies, it would be wiser to quit the voluntary sport 
and focus on education.  Need-based and merit scholarships are available to 
all students; athletics is not the only means of obtaining a scholarship.  
Ninety-eight percent of the student athletes discussed in this Comment will 
not play sports professionally, so it might benefit more students-athletes in 
the long-term if they realized they should not be playing sports collegiately 
either—and instead focus on earning a degree that will carry them to a suc-
cessful career. 
In the long term, student athletes would be worse off by drifting even 
further toward the economic and employment dimension; instead, they 
would benefit from being reined back toward the academic and educational 
aspect of attending university.  A degree and a quality education will take 
them much further in life than a few years of enjoying the benefits of being 
an “employee” while playing a sport that 98.5% of them will never play 
professionally.  These individuals are not employees, they are students, and 
they need to be treated primarily as such.  A scholarship saxophone player 
at a university is unlikely to become a professional in an orchestra and 
therefore needs a strong education so she can succeed at becoming an engi-
neer, a lawyer, or a teacher—and student athletes deserve the same. 
Some might criticize the above remedies and argue that the NCAA 
would never unilaterally impose these degrees of sanctions and reforms.  
The recent Power Five rule changes provide a strong example of why this 
criticism is misguided.  Just last year, one student athlete complained on na-
tional television of having to go hungry certain days because he could not 
                                                          
 223.  NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 2.8.1 (2009–2010).  
 224.  Stephan A. Miller, The NCAA Needs to Let Someone Else Enforces Its Rules, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/10/the-ncaa-needs-to-let-
someone-else-enforce-its-rules/264012/?single_page=true. 
 225.  If a student is not qualified to attend the particular university, it will do more harm than 
good to force him through for eligibility reasons.  Professors, advisors, deans, and tutors should all 
have the ultimate goal of furthering the student athletes’ educational development.  That is the 
core purpose of a university. 
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afford food.226  Within a month, the NCAA released new rules guaranteeing 
unlimited meals and snacks to all student athletes.227  The recent O’Bannon 
and NWU cases prompted the aforementioned conferences and universities 
to guarantee four-year scholarships to all athletes, and other universities 
may follow suit by paying for all sports-related medical costs.228  Early in 
the 2014 season, the NFL (also an oft-criticized body) unilaterally changed 
its suspension policies, both for drugs and for domestic violence, due to 
public pressure.229  With the continuing pressure mounted against the 
NCAA and member universities through court cases, scandals, the media, 
and public outcry, these types of reforms are realistic.230 
E.  Future Outlook for Collegiate Athletics 
There are several student athlete related cases to watch with significant 
implications on the current model of intercollegiate athletics, including in 
the state of Maryland.231 
1.  The NWU Unionization NLRB Case 
Decisions that will be made in the immediate future may have poten-
tially game changing effects on collegiate athletics reform and the power 
held by student athletes.  Whether the Board affirms or reverses the RD’s 
decision,232 its decision may be appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, where the Chevron judicial standard of review for administrative 
decisions becomes an important factor. 
There are two steps to Chevron judicial review: (1) whether Congress 
in the statute has directly spoken to the issue (if so, that is the end of the 
                                                          
 226.  Soraya Nadia McDonald, National Champ U-Conn.’s Napier Says He Goes to Bed Starv-
ing, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/04/08/national-champ-uconns-napier-says-he-goes-to-bed-starving/.  
 227.  Hosick, supra note 179. 
 228.  See Jessica Bartlett, City Council Weighs Mandating Insurance for Life for Injured Col-
lege Athletes, BOSTON BUS. J. (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/health-
care/2014/10/city-council-weighs-mandating-insurance-for-life.html?page=all (proposed city 
council ordinance would require all universities in the city of Boston to cover student athlete inju-
ries sustained during play for life). 
 229.  Ben Volin, NFL Makes Changes to Rules and Procedures, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 21, 
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2014/09/20/nfl-makes-changes-rules-and-
procedures/buxXKk5iDGf0VybjRbuzdL/story.html. 
 230.  Frank Fear, Public Pressure Ignites NCAA Sports Reform, SPORTS COLUMN (July 16, 
2014), http://www.thesportscol.com/2014/07/public-pressure-ignites-ncaa-sports-reform/.  
 231.  Student athlete unionization and reforming collegiate athletics are important both nation-
ally and in Maryland, home to the University of Maryland, College Park, a new member of the 
Big-10, of which NWU is a member.  As a regular opponent, any changes to the standards and 
rules that a unionized NWU team achieves would directly affect the competitive balance in com-
peting against Maryland, a public university outside the Board’s jurisdiction. 
 232.  NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 (finding the SAs were employees under the Act). 
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matter), and if not, (2) whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible 
construction of the relevant statute.233  The first “plain meaning” step can be 
surpassed if the statute is ambiguous or if Congress implicitly or explicitly 
left a gap for the agency to fill using its expertise.234  The second Chevron 
step assesses whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, which is a 
highly deferential review standard rooted in the idea that Congress entrust-
ed the agencies to resolve these types of issues with their expertise and 
knowledge.235 
As long as the agency interpretation is reasonable, it is likely that the 
Board’s decision on appeal would stand.  Typically, if the agency can get to 
step two, “the agency almost always wins.”236  If the Board upholds the 
RD’s decision that the student athletes are employees however, the enor-
mous (and adverse) impact of such a decision may make a reviewing court 
take pause at this traditionally deferential second step. 
2.  The O’Bannon v. NCAA Antitrust Case 
The second important development going forward will be the resolu-
tion of O’Bannon.  If the remedies raising the value of scholarships and 
creating trust funds are upheld, they will greatly benefit college men’s foot-
ball and basketball players, but perhaps (due to Title IX financial obliga-
tions) at the expense of the vast majority of other male student athletes.  
Regardless, allowing some student athletes to benefit financially from their 
image or likeness through a trust fund will remedy the discomforting sense 
of unfairness while also maintaining their amateur status while enrolled. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The fairness of collegiate athletics is deservedly under scrutiny and the 
NCAA and its member universities are under legal and public pressure to 
reform the broken system.  The SAs’ unwise strategy of seeking reform 
through unionization and collective bargaining rights conflicts with govern-
ing precedent237 and ultimately harms the long-term goals of universities 
and their students: to receive a valuable education.238  By wrongfully ap-
                                                          
 233.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 234.  Id. at 843–44.  It is permissible for courts to look at legislative history and intent at this 
step, so there is a possibility the court could find the statute’s purpose did not intend for student 
athletes to be employees.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–
33 (2000) (using statutory construction (including legislative history) to halt Chevron review at 
step one).  More likely, a reviewing court would read Section 2(3)’s definition of “employee” to 
be either an intentional definition gap or sufficiently ambiguous to proceed to step two. 
 235.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45. 
 236.  Richard M. Cooper, Challenging Food and Drug Administration Interpretations of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2003). 
 237.  See supra Part II.A 
 238.  See supra Part II.B. 
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proving the SAs’ petition, the RD thrust the Board into a no-win situation 
where its limited jurisdiction to create reform will further complicate the 
matter and exacerbate the unfairness in collegiate athletics.239  On appeal, 
the Board should reverse the RD’s decision and rule that student athletes 
are not employees of their universities, or should alternatively exercise its 
discretion to decline jurisdiction and vacate the RD’s decision. 
Instead of unions or the Board inserting themselves into the issue, the 
NCAA is the proper body to remedy the current situation.240  With the in-
fluence of courts, public opinion, and universities themselves, the NCAA 
should initiate reforms to address student athlete exploitation and the dis-
dainful college “education” through which some student athletes are shep-
herded.  Keeping in mind that hardly any student athletes will play profes-
sionally, the NCAA should rein back athletic time commitments so that 
students can appropriately focus on success in the classroom that will bene-
fit them for the remainder of their lives.  Rediscovering the student in stu-
dent athlete will realize the true purpose for which institutions of higher 
learning exist. 
The future of collegiate athletics looks more uncertain than ever.241  If 
the Board mistakenly upholds the RD’s NWU decision, collegiate athletics 
will evolve into a two-tiered hierarchy, with unionized-employee student 
athletes who increasingly receive benefits that pull them away from educa-
tion into the economic realm of employment at the top level.  Below that, a 
second tier of all other student athletes will emerge whose existence will be 
increasingly eroded as financial resources transition to the employed ath-
letes due to collective bargaining.  O’Bannon, if upheld, will only affect 
revenue-generating athletes at the top schools, but if more fully embraced, 
will provide student athletes with a valuable trust fund upon graduation 
with which to begin their careers and invest in their future. 
Those that see collegiate sports purely as a “moneybag” (a category 
that must include some university, NCAA, and now union officials) have 
stretched the rubber band encircling higher education to its breaking point.  
If student athletes are deemed employees, the band will snap, releasing 
them into the land of labor and employment, destined to become just a line 
on a balance sheet.  The tension must be relaxed, allowing student athletes 
to return their focus to education, lest we forget the true meaning and pur-
pose of being a university student.  
                                                          
 239.  See supra Part II.C. 
 240.  See supra Part II.D. 
 241.  See supra Part II.E. 
